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ABSTRACT
The Role of Background on Object Identification
(September 1987)
Susan J. Boyce B.S., Ursinus College
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Alexander Pollatsek
This thesis examines the role that scene backgrounds
play in object identification. Previous research has
indicated that objects located in a coherent scene are
easier to identify. This research employed the brief
presentation method used In previous research on scene
perception. Experiment 1 Indicates that objects are more
difficult to identify when they are located in an
"episodically" inconsistent background. Experiment 2
demonstrates that the degree to which non-cued (cohort)
objects are consistent with the target object has no effect
on this object identification task. Experiment 3 shows that
consistent episodic background information facilitates
object identification and Inconsistent episodic background
information does not interfere. The results of these
studies indicate that models of scene perception will have
to be mod i f i ed
.
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CHAPTER 1
I NTRODUCT ION
Experiments on the perception of pictures have
suggested that the Identification of an object Is aided if
the object Is located In a "coherent scene". This work has
generally focussed on degrading a coherent scene in some way
In order to observe the decrement In performance. This has
been done by altering the contents of the scene and by
presenting the scene for brief durations to degrade the
amount of Information obtainable from the visual display.
However, a question that has not been entirely answered Is
which aspects of scene coherence affect object
I dent I f I cat I on
.
A coherent scene consists of objects that can co-occur
In the real world (objects meeting this criterion will be
referred to as "episodically related"). Further, these
objects must be Interacting with one another in a manner
that is consistent with what we know about the objects: most
objects must obey physical laws and constraints due to the
function of the object (e.g. a chair must obey the law of
gravity and be oriented In such a way that it can be sat
upon). However, even If a group of objects meets these
requirements they do not necessar I ly constitute a scene.
Wei I formed scenes also have backgrounds which provide
Information about depth and the spatial relations of the
1
objects. Further, the background could convey global
semantic information that helps to determine the setting of
the scene.
Over v i ew
In the first section of this review I will focus on the
role of scene coherence on object Identification. Most of
the work In this area has employed the brief display
paradigm in order to degrade the quality of the scene
Information. Generally, the results from these studies are
interpreted as evidence for rapid access of "scene schemas"
that facilitate object identification.
The second section summarizes some of the literature on
recognition memory for objects in coherent scenes. The
theory of scene perception that emerges from this literature
Is rather vague, but it resembles the schema activation
argument outlined by Blederman and his colleagues In the
object identification section.
A brief summary of some of the research employing eye
movement monitoring techniques wiM be reviewed in the third
section. Some of the results from these studies are
conflicting, but interestingly enough, the results are all
interpreted as evidence for rapid schema activation
facilitating object identification.
The final section of the introduction is an attempt to
define the role of backgrounds in scene coherence. Scene
backgrounds have been emp
I oyed i n a I most a I I research on
picture processing, but I i t t I e at tent i on has been pa i d to
the role these backgrounds may be playing. m this section
I will outline some possible roles of background
i nf ormat i on
.
0b Ject I dent 1 f i cat I on and Scene Coherence
Early work on object identification in coherent scenes
was conducted by Biederman and his colleagues. Biederman's
early work in scene perception employed photographs of
scenes that were cut Into sections. The sections were
Jumbled (resulting In Incoherent scenes) or left in their
appropriate positions. These coherent and jumbled scenes
were presented to subjects for brief exposure durations
(100-150 ms). In two such studies (Biederman, Rabinowitz,
Glass and Stacey 1974; Biederman 1972) subjects were asked
to Identify objects In Jumbled and non-jumbled scenes that
were presented briefly. They found that Jumbling reduced
the accuracy of identifying objects, even though the objects
remained Intact and in their appropriate positions.
However, Biederman found that the effect of Jumbling was
reduced If subjects were pre-cued for location of the target
object and were shown the pictures of the objects before
stimulus onset. Biederman et al. concluded from this line
of research that when a scene was briefly presented,
4getting an "overall characterization" of the scene helped to
Identify an object If 1) you did not know what you were
looking for and 2) you did not know where to look.
Biederman's Jumbled picture studies were designed to
determine the degree to which destruction of the semantic
coherence of the scene interfered with object
identification. However, the jumbling technique disturbs
more than just the overall coherence of the scene. Intact
scenes were photographs of objects In their backgrounds;
therefore much of the depth information was conveyed in the
gradual shading differences within a background. When the
picture was divided into six equal sections and put together
in the Jumbled configuration, non-target objects were
sometimes divided between two sections. Further, Jumbling
Introduced sharp contours that replaced gradual shading
differences in background information in the non-jumbled
scenes. Consequently, Jumbling scenes in the manner of
Biederman's early experiments does more than simply disturb
the semantic coherence of the scene. The procedure results
in the addition of fragments of objects and un i nter pretab I
e
contours, thus not just destroying information but adding
new information that was possibly disruptive.
In order to rule out the possibility that his effects
in the Jumbling studies were due to un i nter pretab I
background information Biederman (1981) conducted a study
aimed at determining how background information interacts
5with object identification. He prepared stimuli consisting
of semantical ly unrelated objects positioned In a depth
background, a grid background, and a blank background.
Subjects were presented with the sequence of events: 1) the
target name, 2) the picture slide for 200 ms
, and 3) a
location cue. Their task was to indicate whether or not
there was agreement between the target name and object at
the cued location. Surprisingly, error rates were highest
in the depth background condition and about the same in the
no background and grid background conditions.
Blederman concluded from this result that depth
Information has an effect on object Identification only if
It aids In forming a coherent semantic representation
(whatever that means). He argued that with these stimuli,
no such representation could be formed because the objects
were semantical ly unrelated, and thus that capacity used
trying to construct this coherent representation took away
from one's ability to Identify the objects.
Another experiment (Blederman, Glass & Stacey, 1973)
conducted with Jumbled vs. non-Jumbled pictures employed a
visual search task Instead of the previously mentioned rapid
presentation method. The manipulations of Interest were
whether the object sought was or was not present in the
scene and whether the object was I Ikely or unl ikely to occur
in that scene. Subjects were Instructed to view the picture
until they found the target object or determined that the
target object was not present. High error rates were
obtained In the cond.tlons where the object was present and
unlikely and where the object was likely but not present.
Very low error rates were obtained In the condition where
the object was unlikely to occur and was not present.
Reaction times were faster over a I I for coherent scenes.
Subjects were fastest at responding "no" when the target was
unlikely to occur
,
next fastest for "yes" responses, and
slowest for "no" when the target was likely to occur In the
scene but was not present.
Blederman claimed that subjects very quickly accessed a
global meaning of the scene since they made more errors when
the object was present and not likely, and when the object
was likely but not present. This global scene meaning, or
schema, aided object Identification for consistent Items.
Since subjects were faster at finding and Identifying
objects In the coherent scenes Blederman claimed that
Jumbling was responsible for delaying this schema
act I vat I on
.
Other explanations of these data exist that do not
require positing schemas to aid In object Identification.
There Is no doubt that as we move our eyes around a scene we
are building a coherent representation of that scene.
However, the relationship of this schema activation process
to that of activating Individual objects Is not clear.
First, It Is not clear whether schema activation can occur
7rapidly enough to aid the Identification of Individual
objects. Second, even If schema activation preceeds
Identification of objects, It is an open question whether It
Influences the process of object Identification. Blederman
et al. data does not directly answer these questions.
Subjects could have Identified one or two objects In the
scene and decided "no" If the target object was unlikely to
be pictured with the Identified objects. if it was
plausible that the target object could coexist In a scene
with the Identified objects then the subjects kept
searching. if the target object Is present, they will find
It before they have examined all objects In the scene (on
average) and will be able to respond "yes". If the target
Is not present, the subjects must do an exhaustive search of
all objects In order to respond "no". This strategy would
account for B I ederman
' s findings and does not require schema
activation. Subjects could have Just adopted a conscious
strategy of deciding the likelihood of the target object
appearing In the same scene as the one or two objects they
Initially I dent I f I ed
.
This early research led to a flurry of experiments
conducted by Blederman and his colleagues to determine more
specifically when schema activation might occur and the
mechanisms of this activation. Blederman, Mezzanotte, and
Rablnowltz (1982) attempted to determine whether coherence
and thus schema activation was due to the relationships
8between the objects in a scene. They identified five "scene
relations" that make up a coherent scene.
1. Support - Most objects rest on surfaces.
2. Interposition
- Opaque objects occlude their
background
.
3. Probability
- Degree to which an object is
likely to occur In a given scene.
4. Position - Degree to which an object is likely to
occur in a given scene at a particular spatial
I ocat I on
.
5. Size - Degree to which an object is of an
appropriate size given the size of the objects
surrounding It.
Furthermore, Blederman et al. make a distinction
between syntactic relations (1 and 2 above) and semantic
relations (3,4, and 5 above). This distinction is based
upon the claim that detection of a syntactic violation does
not require Identification of the object In question, and
that detection of a semantic violation requires accessing
object identification information. Biederman argues that a
bottom up model of scene recognition (e.g. Marr, 1982)
predicts that syntactic violations would be accessed by the
perceptual system sooner than semantic violations, because
aspects of the object (l.e spatial location) would be
accessed before object identification. Thus, if lack of
support was detected this would interfere at an earlier
9processing stage than if a semantic relation was violated.
The earner the Interference occurs In processing, the more
disrupted performance should be on an object Identification
task .
Blederman et al. (1982) presented subjects with brief
displays (150 ms ) of scenes with objects undergoing various
relation violations. Subjects were given the name of the
target object prior to each trial and then were given a
location cue and mask after the presentation of the scene.
The subjects* task was to Indicate If there was agreement
between the object In the cued location and the name
presented before the display.
Objects undergoing violations Incurred a higher miss
rate and a slightly higher false alarm rate than objects
that were presented in their base positions. Thus,
Blederman argued that objects undergoing violation are
harder to perceive. However, this effect was no less for
objects undergoing semantic violations than for objects
undergoing violations of either support or interposition
Indicating that semantic violations are at least as
disruptive as syntactic violations. Objects undergoing
multiple violations were Identified less accurately than
objects that were violating only one relation.
A second experiment was conducted that Involved the
detection of the violations themselves. Subjects were pre-
cued for the location of the potential violations and after
10
a brief presentation of the scene were to respond "yes" or
"no" as to whether a violation was present at that location.
The results were congruent with those from Experiment 1: the
semantic violations were detected at least as accurately as
the syntactic violations. Furthermore, multiple violations
were easier to detect than single violations.
From these results Blederman concludes that objects
undergoing violation are harder to see than objects not
undergoing violation. Further, he claims that. since
violation of a non-cued object did not Interfere with object
recognition for a cued non-violated object, that the
elicltation of schemas for these scenes was not disrupted by
the presence of a violation somewhere In the scene. in
fact, he states that violation costs were the result of
schema Interference on object Identification. As a result
of this research Blederman and colleagues reject a purely
bottom-up model of scene processing.
The argument against the bottom-up model relies heavily
on the syntactic-semantic distinction. The result that
semantic violations were as disruptive as syntactic
violations seems to Indicate that the bottom-up model is
Incorrect. However, the syntactic-semantic distinction may
not be valid. In order to realize that an object Is
undergoing a violation of support, one has to obtain enough
Information about that object to determine whether It
requires support. Blederman (1982) has since conceded that
11
object Identification wou
. d be necessary to determine
whether an object was undergoing the support v. Cation.
However, he counters by saying that the detection of the
lack of support for an object does not require that we know
what that object is. He argues that lower level assignment
of surfaces during an object parsing stage would provide
this kind of information. This may be true, but it does
little to further the case of the syntactic-semantic
distinction he is trying to defend. Identifying that an
object is not supported is not the same as identifying that
an object Is violating the relation of support. In order to
determine whether the lack of support is a violation or not
still requires object Identification. Th I s same argument
holds true for Interposition relation as well.
The work summarized here along with other research led
Biederman to believe that schema activation occurs very
early in the course of picture viewing. Further, Biederman
claimed that the route to schema activation is not objects-
then-schema as has been proposed by Friedman (1979) and
others. The route that he advocated requires the use of the
relations or interactions between the objects of the scene
and he asserts that this information Is available before the
objects are fully Identified.
The research conducted by Biederman and his colleagues
does Indicate that subjects are able to gain some
information from very brief exposures to pictures. His
12
evidence for accessing relations between objects before the
objects themselves have been identified seems weak.
However, these experinients a,
I clearly indicate that when
scene coherence is destroyed subjects are less likely to
recognize a target object in a scene. Experiment 2 in the
present set of experiments will test Biederman's route to
schema activation.
Object Recogn 1 1 Ion and Scene Coherence
Antes and various colleagues have also attempted trying
to sort out the kinds of Information a viewer can get from
brief displays of pictures. Antes (1977) presented subjects
with 100 ms displays of scenes then tested subjects for
recognition of sections of the scene. The sections were
created by dividing the picture into equal parts (much as
Blederman had done) and the sections were rated as being of
high, medium, or low " i n format I veness " . He found that
accuracy on the section recognition task depended on the
rated i n format I veness of the section (subjects were more
accurate for highly Informative sections) and on the
eccentricity of the section (subjects were more accurate if
the test section had been located near the center of the
picture). A second experiment employing the same
methodology tested subjects' ability to recognize the
location of a target section. Subjects were presented with
13
the scene and then a target section of that scene. Their
task was to indicate where In the scene that sect, on had
appeared. Accuracy on this task was lower overall than on
the section recognition task but performance was still
affected by the I nf ormat I veness of the section and by the
eccentricity ofthetargetsect.cn. since subjects were
more accurate at recognizing the section than localizing the
section Antes proposed that object Identification and object
localization are mediated by two different processes and
that the process responsible for localization is slower.
The evidence for this model seems pretty weak.
In an experiment geared toward identifying global
versus local processing of scenes, Antes, Penland, and
Metzger (1981) presented subjects with brief displays of
scenes followed by an object recognition task. The
manipulations of Interest were scene context (high or low),
usualness of target object (usual or unusual with respect to
context of scene), and consistency of distractor Information
(consistent or Inconsistent with respect to context of
scene). "High context" scenes were well formed scenes with
coherent backgrounds and many objects, while "low context"
scenes were created by deleting the background and some of
the objects from the high context scenes. Subjects saw a
100 ms exposure of the scene followed by an array of four
objects (three distractor objects and one that had appeared
In the scene). Subjects were Instructed to choose the
14
object that they had seen in the display.
For high context scenes subjects were most accurate if
the target object was consistent with the context and the
abstractor objects were inconsistent with the context.
Subjects were less accurate If the dlstractor objects were
aiso consistent with scene context and performance was poor
when the target object was unusual with respect to the
context of the scene. Thus, probability of correct
recognition of an object was Influenced by both usualness of
the target and usualness of the distractors. in contrast,
performance of subjects presented with low context "scenes-
were not affected by the usualness of the target object or
consistency of dlstractor objects. Antes et al. ran a third
group of subjects that were not presented with the scene at
all but Instead read a one sentence dlscrlptor of the theme
of the scene. These subjects then chose an object from the
array of four objects that was likely to occur In a scene
with the particular label. The pattern of data obtained
from this "thematic information group" Is very similar to
the data collected from the high context group.
From this study Antes et al. conclude that global scene
Information Is available after 100 ms of viewing a scene.
Because the results from the thematic information group
parallel those from the high context group, Antes advocates
a "scene emergent features" route to schema activation.
According to this theory, the first fixation on the scene
15
provides g.oba. information about the setting, thus allowing
the viewer to call upon knowledge about which objects to
expect in the scene. His evidence against the objects-then-
schema route is the similarity between the thematic
information group and the high context group. if schema
activation occurs as the result of identifying one or two
objects in the scene, then the high context unusual target
object group should have accessed the wrong schema on trials
where the unusual object was identified first. This should
create a discrepancy between the high context group and the
thematic information group and this descrepancy was not
evident in the data.
Unfortunately, Antes is not able to define what these
"scene emergent features" might be. Biederman defines them
in terms of relations between objects. But if one is to
believe the results of Antes (1977), information about an
object's location is accessed only after object
identification has occurred. This leaves a somewhat muddled
picture about how context helps in picture viewing.
Eye Movement Research and Scene Percept i on
Research on the role of context on object
identification has not been limited to paradigms that employ
brief presentation of scenes. Many researchers have
recorded eye movements during scene viewing to determine the
1 6
ro.e of scene context on a subject's fixation duration and
pattern of fixations. Loftus and Mackworth (1978) were
interested in determining where people will look in a scene
given the opportunity to view the display for 4 seconds.
Some of the scenes they presented contained objects that
were very unlikely to occur given the scene context (I.e.
octopus in a farm background, tractor m an underwater
background). They found that low probability objects were
fixated earlier, were fixated more often, and were fixated
for longer durations. From these data Loftus and Mackworth
claim that subjects readily obtain the "gist" of the scene
(within the first fixation) and partially Identify objects
In the periphery. This partial object identification then
leads subjects to compute conditional probabilities that
these objects are likely to occur given the gist.
Subsequent fixations are then presumably guided to those
objects whose conditional probabilities are lowest.
The examples of the stimuli used in this experiment, if
representative of the stimuli set as a whole, provide an
alternative explanation of these data. The octopus in the
farm background is not only semantical ly or episodically
different from the rest of the scene but Is also different
in terms of low level perceptual features. The farm
background consists predominantly of straight lines and
right angles, whereas the octopus is defined by Irregular
contours and wavy lines. Subjects could have fixated the
17
octopus earner and for longer durations because of tnis
contour difference and not because tney were being
Influenced by the semantics of the object.
If the stimuli presented In the article were not
representat.ve of their st.muM ,n general, and their
results really do Indicate that subjects win ,ook to
objects that are not probable, then the route to obtaining
the gist of the scene must be rapid processing of the
background Information. This would argue that a scene that
either had no background, or a non I n f ormat I ve background
would be processed In a different manner than that outlined
by Loftus and Mackworth.
Antes and Penland (1981) conducted a similar study;
they recorded eye movements during viewing of scenes that
contained high probability and low probability objects. An
additional manipulation was Included In this study. the
degree of background context. High context and low context
scenes were defined as In the Antes, Penland and Metzger
(1981) study described above. They found that first
fixations on expected objects were shorter when they
occurred in high context than when they occurred in low
context. First fixation durations on unexpected objects
were the same In both the high context scenes and the low
context scenes. Data collected on the average saccade length
Indicated superior peripheral identification of objects that
were consistent with the context than of objects that were
1 8
I neons I stent w
,
th the context
. concern
, ng the probab I I I ty
of fixating a I ikely object versus an unl.k.ly object.
little can be said from thi<; «*+nHw ^r u nis study, because probability of
an object occurring
,
n the scene was confounded with
location in the scene so that more unexpected objects
occurred In the center of the scene where subjects began
viewing. An attempt was made to sort out this confounding
and Antes and Penland concluded that objects consistent with
the context were more likely to be fixated early In viewing
while during
I ater v I ew I ng the patter n switches so that
unexpected objects are more likely to be fixated.
Both Loftus and Mackworth (1978) and Antes and Penland
(1981) argue that the theme or gist of the scene can be
obtained very rapidly which results in activating schemas
for these scenes. It Is Interesting to point out that this
concept of schema activation does not constrain the
predictions that can be made concerning the likelihood of a
given object being fixated. Loftus and Mackworth claim that
this schema activation results In fewer fixations on likely
objects while Antes and Penland argue that schema activation
results in more fixations on expected objects. Perhaps a
better understanding of how schemas are activated may make
clearer what schemas are and may help constrain the theory.
Various other studies have been conducted using eye
movements to Investigate scene perception (Mackworth and
Mlrandi, 1967; Nelson and Loftus, 1980; and Salda and Ikeda,
19
'979,. Resu.ts of these stud|es ^ ^ s
confHctlng ,n that the schema argument etn be used to
predict many outcomes. Various other people have studied
memory for pictures (Frledmah.
,979; Parker, ,978). This
literature „,,, not be reviewed at this time since the
issues that are dealt with In recognition memory for
Pictures may be quite different than those concerning
Identification of scenes.
A Definition of "Coherent Scene" Inferred from stimuli and
Manipulations J_n Previous Research
The research reviewed above, when taken together as a
whole, appears to share a common definition of "coherent
scene". The coherent scenes that have been used In these
experiments have common elements. First, coherent scenes
always consist of objects that are episodically related;
meaning that the objects could co-occur In a real world
scene. Second, these objects must maintain certain physical
relationships with one another as Blederman et al. (1982)
have Indicated. Objects must obey physical laws (I.e.
gravity, opaque objects occlude their backgrounds, etc.).
Furthermore, objects must be placed In the scene In such a
way as to establish a consistent viewpoint (I.e. objects
further away look smaller). Third, well formed scenes have
a "background". This third criterion for well formed scenes
20
will be the focus for the rest of the paper
The Role of Backgrounds hi Coherent Scenes
The well formed scenes employed In the experiments
reviewed above have a I I Included some type of background
Information, yet surprisingly little has been said about the
role this Information plays In achieving the meaning of a
scene
.
Blederman (1981) touched on the role of backgrounds In
his Investigation of depth gradients and object
Identification. Depth grad I ents actua I I y interfered with
one's ability to Identify objects. However, the scenes that
he used were not coherent. The objects violated episodic
relatedness and the backgrounds were merely converging lines
constructed to establish a viewpoint for the subjects.
Blederman concluded that background Information (or more
precisely, depth Information) should help only If the
objects are episodically related, but this fact has not been
estab I I shed
.
Antes, Penland, and Metzger (1981) also tangential ly
dealt with the role of backgrounds by nature of the way they
defined high and low context pictures. The high context
scenes used In this study contained many objects (some more
defining of the scene than others) as well as fairly complex
21
backgrounds. The low context scenes were created by
deleting the background and some of the objects from the
high context scenes. Antes et al. found object recognition
performance was much better in the high context scenes than
in low context. Unfortunately, because some objects had
been removed as well as the background to create low context
scenes, no conclusion can be drawn concerning the role that
the background itself plays In providing context (this was
also true of Antes and Penland, 1980, reviewed above).
Furthermore, because Antes did not report how he chose the
objects to be deleted, it Is possible that some context
defining objects (objects that can only fit in that scene)
were deleted, which would create a decrement in performance.
Potent i a I Ro I es of Background I nformat Ion on Object
I dent i f i cat I on
Background information may provide context by helping
to establish a unique viewpoint for the scene and by
providing depth cues. By unique viewpoint I mean
establishing whether It is a top view, or a view from the
left corner of the room etc. This is much the way Blederman
expected his depth gradients to function. It Is possible
that some of the relations between objects that Biederman
has identified are dependent upon background functioning In
this manner. For example, violations of relations of size
22
and support should be very difficult (maybe Imposslbie) to
detect if background depth information is missing.
| t I,
not clear how one can, without depth Information, determine
If an object is In an appropriate place and If it Is the
correct size. it may be possible to construct depth
information from the objects if none is given by the
background, but this process would take much more time.
Another way In which backgrounds may function Is by
providing "episodic cues": the background provides some
Information as to the theme or meaning of the scene. For
example, a Farm Background may contain a barn in the
distance, fences around fields, and perhaps rolling hills In
the distance. In this regard, backgrounds may function as
large objects with recognizable features. Perhaps what
subjects obtain from brief presentations of scenes Is
background Information that then allows them to Infer the
objects that are likely to occur In that background.
The experiments reviewed above indicate that scene
context does alter our ability to correctly Identify and
accurately remember objects. When scenes are coherent
Identification of objects appears to be facilitated and we
are more likely to remember objects that were consistent
with the context. However, It Is not clear from the above
studies the degree to which this apparent facilitation from
scene context Is due to critical objects In fovea, or
critical aspects of the background. The question left
23
unanswered >, the degree to which Benef
, ts from scene
context ere due to the episodic consistency of the
backgrounds
.
The experiments reported here are designed to examine
the role of background Information on the Identification of
objects. Experiment 1 establishes whether depth gradient
information alone Is sufficient to facilitate object
Identification or whether episodic, setting Information Is
obtained from brief displays of scenes.
All three experiments employed the brief presentation
method used by Blederman and others. Conceptually, this
task Is trying to mimic what might occur during the first
150 ms of scene processing, or roughly the first fixation on
a scene. There are a number of reasons why brief exposures
may not mimic first fixations. First, when subjects know
they are only going to have 150 ms of viewing time they may
allocate spatial attention differently. Perhaps an attempt
Is made to "widen" their spotlight of attention to take In
as much of the display as possible and, to the extent that
they are successful In this, there may be a decrement In
processing the fovea I Information. Another possible problem
with this task Is that conclusions about the time course of
processing are not straightforward. The visual display Is
terminated 150 ms Into a trial and subjects' responses (yes
or no In the object Identification task) generally are
produced about 1000 ms after the display Is terminated.
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Th,s
,000 ms response t,me I. not on , y reflating the time
to engeoe In « motor movement (for
. but ton press or voos
,
response) but
.
I
so refiects deoision time. or
-post-
perceptual" processing.
The decision to use the brl.f presentat.on method was
made knowing that the procedure was f | awed In some respects.
This method has been commonly used In p.cture perception
research so that I t makes compar I sons between the current
studies and previous research relatively easy. Also, to
some extent, all methodologies have flaws. Even eye
movement research (which Is by far the most on-line measure
available) Is not without associated problems. it could be
debated that no measure from the eye movement record, such
as flrst fixation duration or gaze duration is an
uncontaml nated measure of the time to Identify an object. A
final reason for choosing the rapid presentation method was
one based on pragmatics. This method was relatively easy to
Implement and the equipment was available.
Over v I ew of Exper Iment
J_
The manipulation of Interest In Experiment 1 was
whether the object to be Identified was presented In an
episodically consistent background, an episodically
Inconsistent background or with no background at all.
Background cons I stent scenes were coherent scenes with
the background conveying Information about the setting of
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the scene. The objects
, coated ,„ the foreground were
cbjects that are like, y to occur ,n that setting. The
objects were positioned in the background in such a way that
does not violate any of Biederman's relations.
Background Inconsistent scenes consisted of well
defined backgrounds that convey information about the
setting of the scene. The objects located in the foreground
were objects that are episodically related to one another,
but could not occur in the background. The objects were
positioned within the background so as not to violate
relations of size or support. Two no background control
conditions were included in order to establish a baseline
for the object Identification task. These no background
condition "scenes" were created by deleting the background
from the scenes in each of the two above conditions.
Biederman's model predicts that objects in the
consistent background scenes would be perceived more readily
than objects in the Inconsistent background scenes.
Further, Biederman's model states that the route to schema
activation (and therefore facilitation in object
identification) is through accessing relations between
objects. Thus performance should be worse in the no
background conditions than In the background consistent
conditions, as no background scenes make it very difficult
(maybe impossible) to identify the relations between the
ob jects
.
26
The bottom-up mode, of object
I dent I f I cat I on
, proposed
by Henderson. Po.latsek and Rayner (1 98 7) posits that scene
context effects may be due to passive spread,
n
g of
activation between
-object" nodes In
. network. Taking this
position to the extreme, one would predict no difference
between any of the conditions In expert
, since the
target object Is always presented with related objects.
However, If backgrounds function as "large objects" and are
represented In the network as nodes the same as other
objects In the scene, then one would predict that
performance on background consistent scenes would be better
than performance on background Inconsistent scenes.
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
I ntroduct I on
Experiment
1 was designed to investigate the ro.e
backgrounds play In object Identification. Scenes were
constructed so that objects appeared either in
consistent backgrounds, Inconsistent backgrounds or no
backgrounds at all. The first purpose of this experiment
was to determine If the degree of episodic relatedness had
an effect on object Identification, and second, whether
consistent backgrounds facilitated object identification or
inconsistent backgrounds interfered with object
identification, or both.
Method
Sub Jects
Sixteen University of Massachusetts undergraduates
participated in this experiment for extra credit in
psychology courses. An experimental session lasted
approximately 55 minutes.
Scenes
The 64 scenes were constructed from an original set of
27
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on
a
16 coherent scenes. Thesp irme e 16 scenes were line drawings of
common rooms of a house fe n RoH ,„6 ( ' g
-
Bedroom scene), common public
Places (e.g. D.ner/lunch counter), and common outdoor scenes
(e.g. street scene) (see Appendix for a list and descrlpt.
of scenes). Each of the original 16 scenes consisted of
background and five objects and they were organized ,n 8
scene pairs with the constraint that objects In both scenes
in the pair be roughly equivalent in real-world size. The
16 Background Inconsistent scenes were created in the
following manner: The objects I n one scene were switched
for the objects In the paired scene. The placement of
objects In the Inconsistent background required that the
objects be rearranged In the two dimensional frame in order
not to violate support, and I n no case was the object's
retinal size altered. The two no background control scenes
were created by e I I m i nat I ng the background from the 16
original scenes and the 16 background inconsistent scenes.
The scenes subtended 16 degrees in width and 14 degrees in
height and the objects averaged approximately 2 degrees in
width and 2 degrees In height and were located 5 degrees on
average from the fixation point.
Pes I gn
The 64 scenes were created from 16 backgrounds and 16
object sets. Each subject saw each object set four times
(one time for each background condition). However, a
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efferent object ,„ the set was cugd ^ ^ ^
exampie, the kitchen sink object set consisted of a coffee
maker, wine giass, toaster, eggbeater
, and a bott.e of dish
washing
,
,
qu . d
.
One of the f
, ve objects
, the d i sh wash i ng
l-quld m th.scase, was never cued. Selection of the
object not to be cued was based upon the difficulty of
labeling it and the degree to which the object was
distinguishable as belonging in that scene. One subject was
cued for the cof fee maker l n the background consistent
condition, the toaster in the background inconsistent
condition, etc. This was counterbalanced across subjects
within a given scene and within a subject across the
different scenes. The correct answer (yes or no) was also
counterbalanced so that for every subject half the correct
answers were yes and half were no. Therefore, across a set
of 8 subjects, all four objects would be tested in each
background condition, half of the time when the object name
was presented and half the time when when the name of an
object not in the scene was presented. Two names of objects
not present were needed for each scene for the no trials.
These object names were chosen so that they were likely to
fit In with the background (list of these names can be seen
In the Appendix, labeled "dlstractor Items"). Trials were
presented in a random order, with the constraint that no two
consecutive trials contained the same background or the same
object set.
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Apparatus
The scenes were displayed on , Megatek Whlzzard Vector
Plotting CRT scope with a P-31 phosphor interfaced with a
VAX 11-730 computer. The computer controlled the experiment
and recorded the subjects' responses and response times.
The scenes were entered Into the computer by , Summagraph
I cs
B i t-Pad
.
Procedure
Subjects first read the name of the target object that
appeared in the center of the screen in front of them. The
name remained on the screen for 3 seconds and was
immediately followed by a fixation cross In the center of
the screen. The fixation cross remained on the screen until
the subject initiated the trial by pressing a response key.
The scene appeared on the screen for 150 ms and was followed
Immediately by a mask (consisting of random line segments
and angles) with a "cue" embedded in it. The cue was a
filled circle approximately 1/2 In diameter. The location
of the cue varied widely, but it was always where an object
had been present In the scene. The subject was Instructed
to respond yes if the name presented at the beginning of the
trial was the name of the object present at the cued
location In the scene. Subjects were to respond no if
target name was not the object at the given location In the
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scene. Subjects' ^es and no responses were made by pressing
a response key w
.
th e « ther the m i dd
, e or
, ndex finger of
their rignt hand, r espeot i ve
I
y . After the subject had
responded, the mask was removed from the screen. The next
trial began with the target name presentation 8 seconds
after the previous response had been made. The 128
exper.menta. trlais were divided Into 4 sets and subjects
were g i ven a 3 minute break between each set. The first two
sets composed the first time through the 64 scenes (and win
be referred as Block 1) and the second two sets were the 64
scenes shown for a second time (Block 2). 32 practice
trials (using different scenes than those in the
experimental trials) were given to each subject to ensure
that they understood the task.
Resu I ts
Dependent Measures
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine what aspects
of background information influence accuracy on the object
identification task. However, there Is no single best
measure of accuracy. One method frequently used is to look
at the probability of hits ( yes when object was present) and
the probability of false alarms ( yes when object was not
present). If the probability of a false alarm decreases
while the probability of a hit increases then assessing
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accuracy ,s pretty stra
I
ght f oward
. However
( , f ^
in the prob.b«.lty Of a hit I, M.OOl.t.d with an increase
in the probability of a fa.se alarm, then assessing accuracy
or "sensitivity" „ more of , prQb|em ^ ^ ^
experiments reported here fa.se alarm rate
.ncreased w.th
the h.t rate. ,n some sense, "percent correct", averag.ng
over ye, and no trials, corrects for the response b.as
problem. other more theor et
. ca .
. y based measures of
sensitivity have been proposed, however. d ' and A'
measures, two such measures des.gned to contro. for response
bias, were also used In the current experiments. A' was
used because It has the capability of dealing w.th
probabilities of 0 and 1 In the false a. arm and h.t rates,
repectlvely (see Gr.er, 1971, for details). m general, the
pattern of results Inall three experiments was the same
across all measures. Therefore,
I will concentrate on
Percent Correct because It Is easiest to Interpret.
In all of the analyses to follow there was a
significant main effect of block (i.e. subjects made fewer
errors In the second block). However, since the block
factor never Interacted with the other factors, data from
both blocks have been combined and block has been dropped as
a factor
.
Although Response Times were recorded the results will
not be reported. The times were relatively long and
extremely variable, so they have been dropped from
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cons i derat i on
.
Accuracy
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to assess the
degree to which backgrounds Influenced accuracy on the
cbject Identification task. Theoretically, this Influence
could be measured In the difference between the Background
C°nSlStent C°ndltl0n and th. Background inconsistent"
COndltl ° n
-
However, since the objects were In different
orientations In these two conditions we cannot assess the
difference simply by looking at the main effect of
Consistency. The interaction between Background Presence
and Consistency Is the appropriate measure of background
effect, since each background condition has a no background
condition matched for location of the objects.
Table 1
Mean Percent Correct and Mean rr on Object Identification
Task i n Exper iment 1
Background Background
Consistent Inconsistent
Background
Present 66.3% (.901) 58.8% (.563)
Background
Absent 67.2% (.901) 67.8% (1.04)
Note - D'ln parentheses.
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The overa,, percent correct was 64.04*. As can be seen
'n Table 1, th. difference between the Consistent Background
condition and Its No Back££o_und_ control was 0.9%. „ hl ,e the
difference between the Background Inconsistent condition and
'ts No Backaround control was 9.0%. This Consistency x
Background Presence I nteract
I on was s
I
gn I f I cant
.
F(1.18).
5.95, p = .028 In a two factor repeated measures Analysis of
Variance. The Consistency x Background Presence Interaction
was significant for the d' measure as well as the A'
measure, F( 1 , 16) - 6.29. P - .024. and F(1
, 16) - 6. 11
.
p .
.039, respectively.
A secondary question Is whether the relatively good
performance In the Background Consistent condition is tne
resu.t of facilitation, or the relatively poor performance
In the Background Inconsistent condition | S the result of
Interference. In order to address this question simple
effects t-tests were conducted on the difference between
each background condition and Its matching no background
condition. The difference between the Background Cons I stent
condition and Its No Background control was not significant,
t(15)
= .414, p > .05, while the difference between the
Background I neons I stent and Its No Background control was
significant, t(15) = 3.87
, p < .01.
Finally, lets briefly look at the False Alarm and Miss
data to demonstrate the trade - off between Hits and False
A I arms
.
35
Error Data
~ Misses and False Alarms
The percentage of misses (subject responds no when
target object was cued) and the percentage of false alarms
(subject responds yes when target object was not cued) can
be seen In Table 2. Overall, subjects m.ssed on 40.58% of
the yes trials and false alarmed on 29.6% of the no trials.
Both the miss and the false alarm data were submitted to a
two way analysis of variance. The miss results will be
d I scussed f i r st
.
Table 2
Mean Percent of Misses and False Alarms for Experiment 1
Background Background
Consistent Inconsistent
Background
Present 36.8% (30.9%) 59.4% (22.7%)
Background
Absent 36.8% (29.7%) 29.3% (35.2%)
Note - False alarms In parentheses.
The main effect of Consistency approached significance
with F ( 1 , 15) = 4.21, p = .058. The Presence/Absence of
Background factor was significant, F ( 1 , 1 5 ) = 16.79, p = .001
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and the Consistency X Background Presence Interaction was
highly significant. F(1,1 5 ) = 25.50, p = .0001.
A two-factor within subjects ANOVA was performed also
on the false alarm data. The background Presence factor was
marg.na.ly significant, F( 1 , 15) - 3 .03,
was a significant Interaction between Consistency and
Background Presence, F(1,15) = 6.54, p = .022.
As can be seen I n Tab I e 2 , the drastic increase in
misses in the Background Inconsistent condition is
accompanied by a less dramatic, but significant, decrease In
the false alarms in the Background Inconsistent condition.
This trade-off suggests that subjects' criterion for
responding 'no' had shifted so that overall they responded
*no' more often in the Background Inconsistent condition,
regardless of the presence or absence of the target object.
D I scuss I on
Analyses of all the accuracy measures indicated that
subjects performed better on the object identification task
when the background was either consistent with the objects
or the background was not present at all. First I will
discuss the difference between the background consistent
condition and the background inconsistent condition. Second
I will address the results of the no background conditions.
As outlined In the introduction, I proposed that
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backgrounds may serve two purposes: to estab ,, sh depth and
s.ze cues, and to prov
, de ep
, sod
, c
,
n format
, on ( theme or
meaning of scene). The background inconsistent scenes in
this experiment were constructed
, n such a manner as to
Preserve the first function of backgrounds while v, dating
the second.
,
t is dear from the pattern of both the
percent correct data and the d</A< data that the episodic
information provided by the background influenced the
subjects' responses on the object Identification task. From
this we can cone I ude that backgrounds do more than just
provide the appropriate depth and size relationships; they
are also important in establishing the meaning of the scene.
Furthermore, the data Indicate that the process of
extracting the meaning from the background can be done very
qu i ck
I
y
.
It is Important to note that the influence of the
backgrounds In this study was not a result of some
diagnostic features in the fovea. The portion of the scenes
that fell on the subject's fovea contained no objects and
contained no diagnostic background features (e.g. a faucet
In kitchen sink scene).
The benefit In object Identification provided by the
consistent background seems to conflict with a strong
Interpretation of the priming model outlined by Henderson,
Pollatsek and Rayner (1987). The Intralevel priming
hypothesis posits that context effects In scene perception
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can be accounted for by an oblect tn nh , *y Dj o object priming
mechanism. S.nce the target object ,n the current
experiment always appeared In scenes with other related
objects, the degree to which the target object was primed
should have been constant across all conditions. However.
If we relax our definition of what can be an object In the
network and conceive of backgrounds as functioning as large
objects then the results obtained In this experiment are not
I ncongr uent
.
The finding that subjects were able to Identify objects
In scenes that had no background as well as they were able
to Identify objects In scenes that had a consistent
background may pose a problem for Blederman's object
relations route to schema act I vat I on . Blederman et al.
(1982) claim that a schema for the scene Is activated on the
basis of accessing Information about the relationship
between the objects In the scene. As I have pointed out In
the Introduction, Information about the relationships
between objects would not be available (or at least only
partially available) In the scenes that had no background.
In the no background scenes employed In this experiment, all
the objects lacked support and violated most of the other
Blederman relations, which are defined In terms of the
object and the background. These violations should have
made performance much worse In the no background condition
as compared to the background consistent condition If the
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re. at. on Information was access
. ng a schema and obJec t
Identification was faC.lt.t.d by thl, schema. The pattern
of results Indicate that this did not happen.
It is possible that subjects' equivalent performance In
the background consistent condition and the no background
conditions was produced by different. off-setting factors.
Good performance In the background consistent condition
could have been due to facilitation from the background. On
the other hand, the good performance in the no background
condition could have been the result of these scenes being
"perceptually easier" since the no background scenes were
considerably less complex than the background scenes. If
the first stage In scene perception Is to Identify where the
objects are In the scene and then parse the object from the
background (I.e. decide which lines belong to the background
and which belong to the object). then It does not seem
unreasonable that performance In the no background
conditions was relatively good. When the no background
scenes were presented. the Initial parsing stage of
processing the scene had already been done, so subjects may
have had longer to Identify the objects.
Experiment 1 Indicated that background Information can
be utilized from a brief (150 ms.) display of a scene
.
However, many questions remain. In Experiment 1 the target
object was always presented along with related objects. As
a result, It cannot address the role that these non-cued
40
objects mlaht have playea
. Furthermorg> we ^
determine precise, y wn y performance In the no background
condition was as good as performance in the consistent
background condition. The next two experiments will aadreS s
these i ssues
.
son
CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
I ntroduct I on
Experiment
1 demonstrated that background Information
Influenced performance on the object Identification task,
even though the subject's exposure to the scene was brief,
in Experiment 1, however, all scenes consisted of a target
object with re.ated objects In one of the background
conditions. Because objects were presented as a set, it I
not clear what effect the non-cued objects had
Identification of the cued object. Henderson, Pollatsek and
Rayner (1987) have found evidence for objects priming
related objects. It Is possible that In Experiment 1 non-
cued objects did prime Identification of the cued object,
but that the effect of this priming was constant across all
cond I t I ons
.
Experiment 2 Is an attempt to sort out the effects of
non-cued objects from the background effects. Possibly,
both related objects and consistent background facilitate
object Identification. in this experiment subjects were
presented with scenes that either had a consistent
background, an Inconsistent background or no background, as
In Experiment 1. In contrast, the target object In
Experiment 2 was presented either with four related objects
or with four unrelated objects. In this way the
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independent ro.es of the cohort eject set and background
can be tested.
Method
Subjects
Sixteen different University of Massachusetts
undergraduates participated In this experiment for extra
credit in psychology courses. An experimental session
lasted approximately 55 minutes.
Scenes
The 128 scenes were composed from the same original 16
scenes as in Experiment 1. These 16 scenes were grouped
into 8 pairs as outlined in Experiment 1. The objects In
one scene of the pair were switched with objects in the
other scene pair resulting In 16 inconsistent background
scenes. In order to test the role of cohort objects, one
object was selected from each scene and switched into the
Inconsistent background, leaving the other four objects
consistent with the background. An examp I e may help to
i I lustrate this: The Bedroom scene and the Ref r i gerator
scene were paired together. In the Background Cons i stent
condition bedroom objects appeared with the bedroom
background. In the Background I neons i stent condition,
bedroom objects appeared with the refrigerator background
(so far this is the same as Experiment 1). In the
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ground consistent/taroe t not with cohorts cond^n the
do. I (bedroom object, appeared ,„ the bedroom background
with four refrigerator objects.
,„ the ground
ihcons I stem/target not with cohorts condition the su , tease
(bedroom object, appeared |„ the refrigerator with four
refrigerator objects. Each of these four conditions had
matching no background conditions (as in Experiment
.)
resulting In 8 conditions (see Table 3 for summary of the
scene conditions).
Table 3
Example of Scene as l_t Appears
_in the Conditions of
Exper Iment 2
.
Wl th
Cohorts
Background
Cons I stent
Target = Do I I
Bedroom background
with bedroom objects
No background
Cons I stent
Target = Do I I
No background
with bedroom objects
Target = Do I I
Not With Bedroom background
Cohorts with fridge objects
Target = Do I I
No background
with f r i dge objects
W I th
Cohorts
Background
neons I stent
Target = Suitcase
Fr I dge background
with bedroom objects
No background
I neons I stent
Target = Suitcase
No background
with bedroom objects
Not With
Cohor ts
Target - Suitcase
Fridge background
with fridge objects
Target = Suitcase
No background
with f r I dge ob Jects
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e
an
in order to avoid cuing the same target object in each
of the eight conditions, two target objects were se.ected
from each object set ( do .. and su . tease ,n the examp
above). These objects were se.ected on the basis of
analysis of the items from Experiment
,. Al I target items
se.ected were identified correctiy75% of the time in
Experiment 1. objects were posit. oned ,n the background in
the same p . aces as In Experiment 1. The s . ze of the scenes,
size of the objects and distance between objects and the
fixation point was the same as In Experiment 1.
Pes I gn
Each subject saw each of the 128 scenes one time.
However, because of the overlap between scenes each subject
saw each background 4 times. each set of non-cued objects
four times and each target object 4 times. On half the
trials the target object name was presented and on half the
trials the name of an object not In the scene was presented.
The correct answer (yes or no) was counterbalanced across
conditions. Trials were presented In a random order, with
the restriction that no two consecutive trials had the same
target ob Ject
.
Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus and procedure employed In this experiment
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were the same as in Experiment 1.
Resu l ts
As in Experiment 1, a trade-off between Hits and False
A i arms required that some measure of sensitivity be
computed.
, n the current experiment, some subjects
rates of 1.00 and fa.se a.arm rates of o . 00 in some
conditions. For this reason d< cannot be computed.
However, the non-parametric measure of sensitivity, A', can
deal with probabilities of 0 and 1. A « can be interpreted
as the best estimate of what the percent correct would have
been If a forced-choice procedure had been employed instead
of a presence-absence procedure.
Accuracy
As with Experiment 1 the appropr I ate measure of the
effect of Background Consistency Is the Background Presence
x Background Consistency Interaction. The overall percent
correct was 65.45%.
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Table 4
r5rr_rrr!5zr
correct in ixp^ent 2^
Background
~ZZ~aZ~,
Consistent ° Background
_
Consistent
W I th
Cohorts 66 4% 68 . 8%
Not With
Cohorts
I neons I stent
With
Cohorts c 7 iq, 65.4%
Not With
Cohorts 54 qq/°*»- y* 68.0%
Table 4 displays the percent correct for each
condition. Collapsing across Cohort for the moment. It can
be seen that the effects of Experiment 1 have been
replicated. The difference between the Background
Consistent condition and Its matching No Background
condition was 3.2%, while the difference between the
Background Inconsistent and Its No Background condition was
10.7%. This Interaction was significant, F(1,15) = 6.47, p
.0225. The pattern of data for the A' measure was
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similar, but thp r^nci^*.e Consistency x Background Presence
interaction was only marginally significant, F(1
., S , . 2
. 97
.
P - . 1054
.
Table 5
Mean A
'
for Exper Iment 2.
Inconsistent
Background
Present 74fl
.602
Background
Absent 7o£
To determine the effect of cohort set, two results
might be of Importance. If it Is assumed that the role
cohorts play In object Identification Is Independent of
background, then a main effect of the Cohort factor should
be evident. However, if cohort set affects object
Identification differently when the background is present or
absent, or when the background is consistent or Inconsistent
then a Cohort x Background Presence x Consistency
Interaction would be present in the data. A three factor
within subjects ANOVA performed on the data Indicated that
there was no effect of Cohort set, either as a main effect,
F < 1 > of Interacting with Background Presence and
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Consistency, P < ,. There ,„ no
-#f-Qt Qf
In the A' data as we I I
Error Data
- Misses and False Alarms
The percentage of misses and the percentage of false
alarms can be seen In Table 6. overall, subjects missed on
35.36% of the yes trials and false alarmed on 33.6% of the
no trials. Both the miss and false ai*rm h *r i la data were
submitted toathree way Analysis of Variance. The miss
results will be discussed first.
The main effect of Consistency was significant F(1,1 5 )
-
34.33, p = .0000, as well as the main effect of Background
Presence F(1,15)
- 25.56, p = .0001. There was no hint in
the miss data of any effect from the Cohort factor. The
Consistency x Background Presence interaction was
significant, F(1,15) = 28.53, p = .0001.
The pattern of the false alarm data looks slightly
different than the miss data. In the false alarm data there
was a main effect of Target With Cohorts, F(1,15) = 8.05, p
.0125. False alarms increased when the cued object
appeared with objects that were plausibly cohorts. The only
other significant effect was the Consistency x Background
Presence interaction F(1,15) = 8.64, p = .0102.
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Table 6
Mean Percent Misses and Fahse Alarms for Exper
.
ment 2
Consistent
With
Cohorts 24 6% rai ov.\*«.B* (41.2%) 2 5.0% (37.3%)
Not With
Cohorts 23.5% (36.1%) 23 .5% (28.4%)
Background
"Nolackground"
!.?!"!l!!!
nt Inconsistent
Wl th
COh°rtS 67 ' 8% (29.0%) 29.7% (40.6%)
Not With
COh° rtS 66 ' 6% (22.8%) 31.1% (33.4%)
D I scuss I on
The percent correct data and the A prime data (to a
lesser degree) replicate Experiment 1. Subjects performed
equally well In the no background conditions as in the
background consistent conditions. Furthermore, performance
dropped when the background was inconsistent with the target
object as compared to the background consistent condition
where the background was consistent with the target object.
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Perhaps the most surprising result from Experiment 2
, s
that it mace no difference whether the target object was
surrounded by consistent or inconsistent cohort objects. ,t
-s particu.ar.y interesting that, even in the no background
conditions, there was no ef feet of cohort set
. It seemed
Mkely that without background to aid ,„ obtaining the
"theme" of the scene, subjects might be abie to utilize
information from the surrounding objects more. This was not
the case. First
.
wou
. d . , ke to discuss the ramifications
of these resu.ts for Blederman's object reiations modei.
Then,
|
will discuss the imp.
.cations of these resuits for
the object to object priming model outlined by Henderson et
a I .
Blederman et al. ( 1 982 ) c I a i med that the route to
schema activation was through Identification of the
relationships between objects. in the current experiment,
the target object violated the probability relation in some
conditions (the degree to which an object Is likely to occur
In the scene) no matter how one defines probability (with
respect to the background, with respect to the other
objects, or with respect to both). Even in the strongest
case of violation, where the background and all non-cued
objects were from the same scene and only the target object
was inconsistent, only an effect of background was obtained.
This calls into question Blederman's route to schema
activation. The information subjects were obtaining from
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scenes where the target object was not „, th its cohorts
should have been degraded and schema act|vat
, on ^
been s , owed or possibly
,„hlblted altogetner
. The
discrepancy between the current data ,„« »1 a an d those obtained by
Blederman et al. „ particularly surprising since care was
taken to ensure that the object Identification task employed
In this experiment was the same as the task used bv
Blederman et a I
. , have essentially not replicated
Experiment
,
of Blederman. Mezzenotte, and Rablnowltz
( 1982)
.
Experiment
1 Indicated that the Henderson et al. object
to object priming model would have to be modified: if the
background functions as a large object priming other objects
then, a priming explanation can account for the decrement In
performance when the background Is Inconsistent. However,
even this modified version of this model cannot readily
account for the lack of effect of cohorts In this
experiment. According to the priming mechanism, we should
have seen a benefit when the target object was presented
with cohorts as opposed to being presented with unrelated
objects
.
There are some possible explanations as to why
Henderson et al's model does not fit these data. One
possibility is that the task used In this experiment taps
processing at a considerably later stage. Henderson et al's
object priming effects were reflected In fixation durations,
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s
wh,,e the subject had considerably more time to looK at the
object. subjects In the current expeMment saw the scene
" °
n ' y 150 and the object ,n the,r fovea,
region. Probably the most lmDO rtant difference between
Henderson's prlmlng paradigm and the current methodology
,s
the difference between objects being presented foveally or
Parafoveal, y. The current object ident I f ,cat Ion task may
have been tapping some reconstructive process that subjects
engaged In after the scene was no longer present. Th
I
possibility will be discussed In more detail In the Genera,
D I scuss I on
.
Another possible explanation for the lack of priming
effects in the current experiment has to do with what should
prime what. Henderson et al's priming was achieved with
objects that were semantical ly related (i.e. Doctor - Nurse)
and not necessarily episodically related. This is not to
say that Doctors and Nurses cannot co-occur In the same
scene, because of course they can. However, the stimuli in
the current experiment were always episodically related but
many times were not semantical ly related (i.e. Doll -
Suitcase). Both a doll and a suitcase can easily occur
together In a bedroom scene, but they are not semantical ly
related. Taken out of the context of the bedroom, one would
predict little priming of doll from suitcase and vice versa.
This too will be discussed further In the General
D I scuss I on .
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in conc,us,on.
, t appears th>t ^ ^^ ^
background consistent „ th th. target QbJect ^ ^^
..rg. whereas the degree tQ ^ ^
objects a re consistent with the t.rget object has nttle or
no effect.
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
I ntroduct j nn
At this pent we know that the degree to which a
background is cons
« stent w
, th the tar get object predicts
Performance on the object identification task. However, we
do not know preclseiy in what manner the backgrounds are
operating. ,f we assume that having a consistent background
facilitates object identification, then there is a prob.em
reconciling the resu
. ts from the no background conditions.
If facilitation from the appropriate background aids object
identification, then performance In the no background
control conditions should have been worse than in the
background consistent condition. However, to accept the no
background controls as the appropriate baseline In this
object identification task one wou I d have to argue that
there Is no facilitation from the consistent backgrounds,
only interference from processing an inconsistent
background
.
There Is reason to be I I eve that the no background
conditions are really not the appropriate control condition.
As outlined In the discussion of Experiment 1, much is left
uncontrolled in the no background condition. No background
conditions not only lack the "theme" information that
background conditions have, but they are also less complex.
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Sheets may be ab,e to «dent,fy mor. object. ,n the no
background conditions because they do not have to „ rat
Identify where the objects are and parse the objects f rom
the background. A better contro, wou , d be one that
preserved background compiexity. yet had no rea, meaning.
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to test the consistent and
inconsistent background effects against a more appropriate
control condition.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-four different University of Massachusetts
undergraduates and Un.vers.ty of Massachusetts graduate
students in psychology participated In this experiment. The
undergraduates received extra credit In psychology courses
for their participation. An experimental session lasted
approximately 55 minutes.
Scenes
The same 16 original scenes were employed as the
consistent background scenes. Inconsistent background
scenes were created from these original 16 scenes In the
same manner as Experiment 1. Instead of no background
control conditions, Nonsense Backgrounds were used as a
control. Nonsense backgrounds were created by distorting
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the orH.n* background.
,n order to de,ete the "theme"
InfOfMtlOfl contained |„ the backgrounds. D, s tort,ons were
created w.th the ,.,,«,,„, crlterla ,„ m(nd:
backgrounds should not lonk *ko like the original backgrounds;
subjects should not b#» »hi«. *~e able to name these backgrounds;
rough, y the same number of Mnes and angles should be
emp.oyed ,n the nonsense background as ,n the original;
nonsense backgrounds should preserve a three dimensional
quality. The nonsense backgrounds resulting from this set
of cr.ter,
a did not appear as a random set of ,
, ne segments,
but as a "coherent" background that lacked any theme
informat.on. An Informal pilot test of the backgrounds
indicated that subjects could not attach a name to the
backgrounds. Even pilot subjects who were familiar with the
original backgrounds were unable to Identify which nonsense
background was constructed from which original background.
It was Important to preserve the three dimensionality of the
nonsense backgrounds In order to provide planes on which
objects could be supported. This was achieved with all 16
nonsense backgrounds. The objects were situated In the
nonsense backgrounds In exactly the same places as they were
In the no background conditions of the previous studies.
Pes I gn
The design of Experiment 3 was essentially the same as
Experiment 1. The only difference was that Instead of no
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background control conditions f haam io , t e nonsense background
controls were employed. Each obJect was ^ ^ ^ ^
each subject and the cond.tlon
,„ wh.ch any g , ven object was
cued was counterbalanced across subjects. The correct
answer, ^es or no, was also counterbalanced. Trials were
presented
,„ a random order, with the constraint that no
backgrounds were repeated on consecut
I ve trial., and no
object sets were repeated on consecutive trials.
Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus and procedure employed in this experiment
was the same as Experiments 1 and 2.
Resu I ts
As In Experiment 1, there was a main effect of block in
all the analyses (i.e. the second time through the scenes
subjects performed with fewer errors). However, the block
factor did not interact with any of the factors of interest
so In the analyses to be reported here, the data has been
collapsed across block and block has been dropped as a
factor
.
Accuracy
As with Experiments 1 and 2 accuracy was assessed by
percent correct and A'. In order to assess the role of
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consistent and inconsistent backgrounds a two factor within
subjects Ana.ys.s of Var
, ance was per formed on the data.
The overaii percent correct was 62.0*. Subjects were 3.6%
more accurate
,
n the Background Cons
. stent cond
, t
. on than
the matching Nonsense Background cond i t i on and were 1
.
5%
less accurate in the Background inconsistent condition than
the matching Nonsense Background. This Consistency x
Background Type Interaction was significant, F(1, 23 ) = 4.33,
P = -0487. Although the pattern of data was similar for the
A' measure, the Consistency x Background Type interaction
was not significant, F(1,23) = 2.04, p = .1671.
Table 7
Mean Percent Correct and Mean v on Object Identification
Task for Exper iment 3
.
Background
Cons I stent
Background
neons I stent
Mean I ng f u
I
Background 65.6% (.721) 59.4% (.675)
Nonsense
Background 62.0% (.670) 60. 9% ( . 676)
Note - A primes in parentheses.
The primary purpose of conducting Experiment 3 was to
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«et erm ,ne „ th. gooa performance ^ ^
Consistent condlt.on »as dUe to f.OMt.t.on or wnetner the
Poor Perforce in the BaoKsrounc Consistent conation
was due to interference. In ord^r ^ *e to assess this, simple t-
tests were performed between tho a ,B e Background Consistent
cond.t.on and
,
ts match
, ng Nonsense Background condition
and ^tween the Background inconsistent cond.t.on and ,ts
Nonsense Background control. As can be seen in Tabie 7, the
difference between the Background Consistent condition and
the Nonsense Background condition was 3.6%. This difference
was s.gnmcant, t(23)
. 2 . 096, p < . 05 . The difference
between the Nonsense Background and the Background
inconsistent cond.t.on was 1
.596 and this was not
significant. The d.fference between the Background
Cons. stent and the Nonsense Background on the A' measure was
•061. This difference was significant with a one tailed t-
test, t(23)
= 1.953, p < .05. The difference between the
Nonsense Background and the Inconsistent Background
condition was
.001 for the A' measure. This difference was
not s
I
gn i f I cant
.
Er ror Data
- M I sses and Fa I se A I arms
The percentage of misses and false alarms for each
condition can be seen in Table 8. Overall, subjects missed
on 48.8% of the yes trials and false alarmed on 27.2% of the
no trials. ANOVAS were performed on both the miss and false
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alarm data. The miss results win hi^^i be discussed first
Tab I e 8
Mean Percent Misses and False Ai, rme c2JH r i
.
la s for Exper iment 3
Inconsistent
Mean i ngf u
I
Background 38 . 6% (30>8%) 57.3% (22.9%)
Nonsense
Background 47 4% (0 o 7 q,n(28.7%) 51.8% (26.6%)
Note
- False Alarms In parentheses.
The two significant effects in the miss data were a
main effect of consistency F(1,23) = 17.84, p =
.0003, and
the Consistency x Background type interaction, F(1,23) =
19.52, p = .0002. As can be seen in Table 8 subjects
missed more frequently in the background inconsistent and
the nonsense background conditions than in the background
consistent conditions.
Analysis of the False Alarm data revealed a main effect
of. Consistency, F(1,23) = 4.97, p = .0359 as the only
s i gn I f I cant ef f ect
.
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D I scuss l on
The results of the Cons|stent
_ |ncons|stent
BaCk9r°Una C°ndltl0nS
'" «"PT.-nt 3 replicated th,
'nd.ng. of Experiments
, ana 2
. The ^
r-u.t from the current experiment. however
, ^ ^
that backgrounds that are eplsodlcaliy consistent see. tc be
'-II It.tin, object ld.ntlf.ctlon.wh... b.oKground. that
are episodically Incons.stent appear not to Interfere.
't thus appears that the no background conditions
employed in Experiments 1 and 2 were not th.e appropriate
baseline upon which to Increment facilitation versus
interference. The good performance on no background
conditions was apperantly due to the fact that these scenes
were perceptua
.
I y eas I er . The nonsense background emp I oyed
in the current experiment Is a more reasonable control
condition. Subjects still had to Identify where the objects
were !ocated In the scene and parse the objects from their
background. but attention and capacity spent processing the
background would not have aided the subject In the object
i dent i f l cat I on task
.
One assumption about the processing of scenes must be
made, however, if one Is to believe that the nonsense
backgrounds were an adequate contro I . The assumpt I on is
that processing of the background must go on in parallel, to
some extent, with the processing of the objects. if a
strictly serial model of processing Is assumed, (one that
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says Identify backgrounds first don-,S
'
t continue unt I I
baCk9rOUnd
—«*"*!—
.
and then identify obJects
<th remaining time, then ltcou
, dbe^ thata||of ^
t.M when , h. scene was „,„„„
_ attempt|na ^^
sense out of the nonsense background, and thus th. subJect
never had t.m. to
, d.„ t ,,y the objects. However.
, f th „
were th. case subjects shou,d not nave been any better than
chance
,„ the nonsense background condition and they did
perform significantly better than chance.
The pattern °f "benef 1 1 •• from cons I stent backgrounds
and no "cost" from the Inconsistent backgrounds „
Interesting from an ecological validity viewpoint. Had the
result, been ,n the opposite direction, that.,, an cost
for
.ncons, stent background and no benef, t for consistent
background, then one might have argued that the results were
less interesting. After all, how often In " rea I
-wor I d
"
perception do we see refrigerator objects In the bedroom, or
vice versa? The results obtained from Experiment 3 fit
nicely with how one might expect the perceptual system to
work; that Is, consistent I n format Ion facilitates object
Identification, but Inconsistent Information does not
interfere. If Inconsistent Information Interfered then one
would be at a real disadvantage In Identifying an object
when that object was Inconsistent. This would predict that
If a lion were In your living room It would take you a long
time to Identify that I t was a lion. This organization
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would not be very adaptive.
'* to acertaln whether benef|t
conslstent lnformatlon
" ~. for lnconslstent
„ predlcted by schena activation
_
beca^ ^
^ b',nMftWl6lt
"0-.. Of activation
whether
.Ct,v.t,„8thewrena8chema |nt9rferM ^ ^
activating the right schema facilitates, or both.
The pattern of benefit from consistent information and
no cost from inconsistent information was a
, so observe,
,„
fixation
.oration data reported by Henderson et a,
Henderson et a,. found that having a reiated object in the
fovea prior to fixating the target object resulted ,„ faster
naming times to the target obJect
. Furtnermore he ^
that having an unrelated object as the prime did not
'hterfere with naming as compared to a neutral baseline.
This issue of facilitation versus Inhibition will be
discussed further In the general discussion.
CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
AM three experiments reported here demonstrated that
scene backgrounds p
,
ay a role
,„ object I dent I f I cat I on when
the scene ,s presented for a br „, duration, the degree to
which a background
„ consistent with the target object
Predicts performance on the object identification task.
,„
addition. Experiment 2 Indicated that there Is no effect of
the surrounding, non-cued cohort objects on this process.
Finally. Experiment 3 showed that the reiatlvely good
Performance In the Background Consistent condition Is the
result of facilitation and the relatively poor performance
in the Background Inconsistent condition I, not the result
of Interference.
These results (particularly the results of Experiment
2) pose some problems for the object relation route to
schema activation as proposed by Blederman et al. (1982).
Experiment 2 did not replicate his finding that subjects
perform worse on the object Identification task If the
target object Is undergoing a violation.
I would conclude
from this that Blederman's conception of what activates a
schema and how that schema operates Is not quite accurate.
In the Introduction, I outlined Blederman's model for
schema activation. He assumes that some relations between
objects can be understood before the objects are fully
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i dent i f i ed ( i e th0 ^<••• th. syntactic re, at, ens, support ana
interposition).
i h9 waave argued that this is not a va i i
d
assumption. Blederman et al claim *hi
• that these relations
between objects »-£»are res Bcnslb,e for activating the
appropriate schema for the scene. Furtherm0re. theyciai.
that the schema that „ activate, then facntates further
identification of objects. They assert t-h.* une hat when an object
-s undergoing v.o.at.cn, the correct schema can be accessed
but that this schema activation interferes with identifying
the object undergoing v.olat.on. Presumably this
interference occurs because the schema dictates not
what objects can occur in the scene, but where those objects
are Mke.y to occur. Experiment 2 in the present series of
studies does not provide any evidence that object reiation
information dictated which schema should be activated and
that this schema interfered with the identification of the
cued object. ,f this were the case, subjects should have
performed worse In the background inconsistent condition
when the target object was not with its cohorts than when It
was with its cohorts. This was not the case. However, it
should be noted that Experiment 2 was only able to address
the relation of probability. The other relations, support,
interposition, position, and size were not directly
manipulated in any of the present experiments.
The question then presents itself, can we modify
Blederman 's schema activation model to account for the data
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presented here? th«.^re. The obvious possibility
, s that the
background activates the schema -n instead of object relations.
Perhaps subjects rapidly identicp ai ntify the background as well as
Partially Identify some of the objects Th,« , .uu . is Information,
-o.tly background
.nformatlon, lessee a schema ^ ^
scene and the schema faOMtate, object Id.nt meat lon . The
-v.d.nc. presented here may be cons
, stent „ i th th , s view
but dees not exclusively point to this Interpretation.
The background, employed In these three experiments
were fairly constrained In that the theme of the scene was
dear from the background. By this I mean that the
sink scene was constructed In such a way that It could only
be a kitchen sink and would not be confused with a bathroom
sink or with any other background. But what wou,d happen if
the backgrounds were less constrained so that the
information obtained from Identifying the background did not
necessarily predict what the scene was about? if schema
activation is a result of correctly Identifying the
background, then one of three things could happen If scenes
were constructed with "generic" backgrounds. When presented
with nondescript backgrounds subjects might settle on one
Interpretation of the background, access that schema and If
they were right, facilitation should occur, whereas If they
are wrong the schema should Interfere. This option does not
seem very plausible because they would on average be wrong
more than right. Another possibility Is that the generic
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hackground may access schemasfora||
plausibly have that background. p.rh.p. ^
aCt,Vat,0n
°
f
"» th. aff.ct, 0# schema
"olllut,on or
'•"•"•'•no. shou,d be less than wlth
aeSCMP" Ve b3CkSr0
— F '-"y. schemas may on|y be
activated when the backgrounds are comDlete enough t<j fa|My
aCCUr" ely ™ S the c°rre" -oh—. ,n thl, case th.r.
•hOU.d be no effect of generic background over the nonsense
background. Unfortunately, the data from the ourrent
experiments cannot address this issue so a definitive ans.er
must wait until the appropriate experiment Is done.
To summar.ze. although we oan not rule out that schema
activation might have been playing a role In the current
experiments, we can conclude that Blederman's route to
schema activation may not be correct. At this point I would
like to move on and discuss the ramifications of these data
for the entirely bottom-up approach to scene context effects
as outlined by Henderson et a I .
Henderson etal. has provided evidence that an object
fixated prior to fixating a target object can facilitate
Identification of the target object If the previously
fixated object was semant leal ly related (i.e. dog primes
cat. coat primes hat). The evidence from the current
experiments does not entirely support his claim that these
sorts of priming effects can account for scene context
effects. There are some reasons however. why the current
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results may differ from those presentee Dy Henderson et a,
In the following section
l will explain these differences
and the extent to which these di<«..differences might or might not
affect the conclusions drawn Py Henderson.
I" us
pures t form, the object to object priming
hypothesis would predict that there should he no effect of
background on the object Identlf, cat, on task since th ,i-a^K , e only
facilitation should rpsnn- c~e ult from other non-cued objects
Priming the target object Tho h 4-y o . e data presented ln these
three experiments is in hi-~ *.IS I direct conflict with this
hypothesis. The major finding was the ,nf,uence of
background information on object identification, and there
was no effect of the cohort or non-cued objects in
Experiment 2. As , |nd|cated |p ^ ^
Experiment 1. we can reconcile the first f, ndlng (role of
backgrounds) with the Henderson mode, I f we assume that
backgrounds are operating much as objects do, only that they
are easier to Identify because they are so large. However,
this modification does little to help explain why we
obtained no pr im i ng from the cohort set i n Experiment 2.
For this reason I would like to further expiore some of the
differences in methodology to try account for these
apparently conflicting results.
One possibility is that the measures Henderson employed
(fixation duration, naming time) and the measure used In the
rent experiments (yes/no response to objectcur
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ng
' dentlflCat,0n qU6St,0n)
stages
H6nderSOn
^ (1987)~gethlsposslb|||ty
_
claim that the object identification * „ncatl task employed in
Blederman's research and the DresP n.6 P e t research may tap
processing at a scene Intearatinn .*g o stage rather than at an
object Identification stage. That l», s
« objects that are
consistent with the scene contevtx are more easily Integrated
'nto the representation of the scene and therefore
or absence of the target object is read from.
, t , s not
Poss.bie ,n the context of the current experiments to
localize the effects to a specific point ,„ the time course
of processing.
Henderson et a.. a
. so c
. a lm that
, to the extent to
which the priming mechanism Is automatic, It should occur ,n
all scene processing even If post-perceptual processing
, s
occurring. Evidence for th
. s automat I c priming between
related objects was not observed in the current research.
However, the objects may have to be fixated (or at least be
close to fixation) in order for the priming to occur. m
the current experiments none of the cohort objects were
fixated and all were greater than 2 degrees from fixation.
On the other hand, the evidence obtained from
Experiment 3 does suggest that automatic processing is
occurring. To the extent there was a benefit and no cost
related to the episodic appropriateness of the background
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Indicates that these . ft^,.e fects are net due tc seme conscious
Pr0b ' em
""""«"'•*•«* If a conscious prob,em soM„ 9
strategy was emp
, oyed by the subJect ^ ^ ^
subject making predictions about what was present ,„ the
scene then there should have been Interference effects
,„
the Background inconsistent condition as wen as
facliltatlon ,n the Background consistent condition.
An assumpt,cn that must be made In crder for object to
object priming to account for scene context effects Is the
assumption that objects which fit In the scene are more
likely to be semantical ly relate *•« ~„°'< ated to one another than
objects that could not fit In the scene , ,m n^n . I a not convinced
that this assumption Is complete. y valid. The present
experiments did not demonstrate any cohort effects. For the
sake of argument, however, ,ets assume that a cohort effect
would be observed If the objects had been fixated. For
example, a doll and a suitcase both appeared In the bedroom
scene of this experiment and were responded to as if they
were consistent with the scene context (i.e. subjects made
relatively few errors). A car ton of m i I k was put in the
bedroom background in the Background Inconsistent condition
and subjects responded to the carton of milk as though it
was Inappropriate In this context (subjects made more
errors). it Is hard for me to believe that "suitcase" and
"doll" are more semantical ly related than "carton of milk"
and "doll". So It seems as though the validity of the
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priming mechanism for pictureP perception
l s dependent uponhow one defines what should prime what y' . Many objects used
in the current experiments may not bey considered
" semant
I ca I I y related" ~•'•
.
mean,ng that they are not from the
same semantic category Furt-h-.-y- rt ermore, most objects In these
experiments are not strong associates of one another (as
were the objects used by Henderson). However. Henderson
used semantic associations between objects and th,s may not
^ appropriate. Perhaps the underlymg principle concerning
what should prime what the f regency 0# oo-occurence of
the objects in the real-world.
in cone. us. on, there are some reasons why Henderson et
I. wou.d have observed pr, mlng effects that ^ ^
apparent
,„ the current data. However,
, think the current
data argue that Henderson's object to object priming
mechan.sm cannot account for all of the scene context
effects. P, rst
, lt seems un||ke|y ^
informat.on P . ays such an
. mpor tant role at, perhaps. a
later
.ntegratlon stage, without It hav.ng some effect at an
earner process
.
ng stage. Second, the priming mechan.sm I.
based upon the assumption that objects co-occurring In a
scene are semantic primes of one another. Thus, If we were
to present scenes In which the objects were not semantic
primes of one another but could co-occur In the scene, we
should not get context effects. Evidence from less on-line
measures seems to Indicate that context effects can occur
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even when the objects are not semantlc pr|mes Qf _
3"0ther
'
Th ' S
» w, tn two 188U.S: can . prlmlng
mechanism acoount for the context effects |f ^ ^_
define what should prime what. „„,. ^; and how do we determine what
shou.d prime what, The data presented here do little to
answer these puestlons other than to suggest that a mode,
based on pr,m,n 9 would have to aocount for backgrounds
Priming objects and the priming network should be organized
acoordlng to eplsodio oo-ocourenoe. rather than semantlo
re I atedness
.
UP to this point
. have tried to indicate how two
extreme.
y different mode . s of scene perception wou
. d nave to
be a.tered in order to account for data fro, the current
experiments. The route to schema activation wou i d have to
be changed from object reiatlons to some other route. The
current data suggest that, at .east when the backgrounds are
constraining enough and when there are no fovea I objects,
then background identification may be the route to schema
activation. Furthermore, the data suggest that once the
appropriate schema Is activated, the effect of the schema Is
only facilltory and not inhibitory. m order for a priming
mechanism to account for the current data, the priming
network would have to be organ i zed on the principle of
episodic co-occurence, not semantic relatedness.
Furthermore, It must be assumed that backgrounds can operate
like large objects in this episodically arranged network.
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The current data cannot d i st I nau i <?h ki i g ish between the revised
schema model or th*» rowi~e revised prl mlng mode|
. Th , s^^further research.
The research presents * =P sented here has contributed to our
know. edge about scene process a h 1 rst
• we havedOTO"StrSted th
" ""—<.»•. effects can be achieved even
»^n there are no diagnostic objects or diagnostic features
in the fovea. The background effects obtained
,„ „ , three
Of the experiments reported here Indicate that subjects can
Hentlfy backgrounds even thou g h ,n order to do so they mU st
Process Infornnat, on that ,. presented peripherally as „„,
as foveany. Second. ,t appears that context effects due toground are faCMtory
,n nature and not Inhlbltcry
Future models of scene process,
n
g should not only account
for context effects ,n terms of other objects ,n the scene,
but should explicitly Include the facilitating role that
backgrounds can clay In object Identification.
APPEND
I X
Scene name In parentheses inHi *.background inconsistent conations** ^ W3S used for
* Indicates non-cued object
Scenes and Object s
D i stractors
1
.
Bedroom
(Ref r i gorator
)
1
.
Teddy Bear
2
. Do I I
3 . Su i tease 1 Rad io
4. Baseball Cap 2 - Ala™ Clock
5. Pennent *
2. Broom Closet
(Desk
)
1
.
I ron
2. Scrub Brush
3. Paper Towels
4. Bucket
5. Wlsk Broom *
1
•
Vaccuum C I eaner
2. Dust Pan
3. Clothes Closet
(Oven
)
1
.
Pants
2. Bowtie
, _
3. Glove I' ?>at
4. Shoe 2 - Sock
5. Hat *
4. Construction
(Porch
)
1
.
Dr I I I
2
. Hammer
3 . Saw
4. Saw Horse
5. Ladder *
1 . Screwdr I ver
2. Wrench
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Desk
(Broom Closet)
1
•
Br i ef case
2
. Lamp
3. Phone 1 - pad of Paper
4. Stapler 2 • Ruler
5. Picture *
D I ner
(Shower
)
1
.
Coffee Cup
2. Fork
3. Salt Shaker 1 1 Menu
4. Syrup Pitcher 2 - Plate
5. Ketchup *
F i rep I ace
( Laundry
)
1
. Cand I
e
2. Chair
3. Clock
4. Logs
5
.
Be I I ows *
1
• Matches
2. Poker
Ref r i gerator
(Bedroom)
1
• Butter
2. Cheese
, ol _ ,
3. Lettuce 1' *' X
4. Ml Ik
2
'
Egg Carton
5
. On i on *
Laundry
(F I rep I ace)
1
.
Laundry Basket
2. Laundry Soap Box
1 . Clothes Pin
I' c!?
9
?
r 2
-
Ham Per4
. Sh I rt
5. Bleach *
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10. Oven
(Clothes Closet)
1
•
Sauce Pan
2
. Spoon
3
. Teapot 1 • Ski I let
4. Turkey 2 - Spatula
5
.
Oven M I t *
1 1
.
Poo I
(Street)
1 . FN pper
2. Raft
3
. Gr I I I
4
.
Beach Ba I I
5
.
Life Saver *
1
•
Beach Cha I
r
2. Snorkel
12. Porch
(Construct I on)
1
.
B I rdhouse
2
.
Ro I I erskate
3. Pumpkin 1' Cat
4. Newspaper Z ' Flowe r Pot
5
.
Water I ng Can *
13. Kl tchen sink
(Toi let)
1
.
Cof f ee Maker
2. Eggbeater <
3
' Toaster l
,
4. Wine Glass 2> ° iSh Rack
5. Dish Detergent *
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1
.
Air Freshener
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